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DOING THE RIGHT THING FOR ONE’S CHILDREN: 
DECIDING WHETHER TO TAKE THE GENETIC TEST FOR 
HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE AS A MORAL DILEMMA 
 
Abstract  
This is a qualitative examination of candidates’ decision-making in relation to the 
genetic test for Huntington’s disease (HD). Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with nine participants who were asked about factors influencing their 
decision whether to take up predictive genetic testing. Transcripts of interviews 
were subjected to interpretative phenomenological analysis to elicit emergent 
themes. A key factor for participants was to do the right thing for their children. 
Interestingly this factor presents a moral dilemma to participants and can direct 
them either towards or away from testing. This paper offers a detailed examination 
of how participants think through this dilemma. 
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Introduction 
Huntington’s disease is a dominantly-inherited, progressive, neurodegenerative 
disorder, usually of adult onset, characterised by motor disability, affective 
disturbance, and cognitive impairment. A predictive genetic test is available which, 
in the overwhelming majority of cases, is unequivocal; a positive test result means 
the individual will develop HD at some time in the future, unless they die of another 
cause earlier. There is currently no cure and time of onset is unclear. A positive test 
will also change the risk status of any children they have from 25% to 50%. How 
does an individual decide whether to undergo testing? 
A survey of motives of at-risk individuals seeking testing found an important reason 
was ‘to clarify the risk for their existing children’ (1). In a questionnaire study of at-
risk individuals choosing not to test, the biggest factor given was ‘if my risk goes up 
so does that of my children’ (2). 
Qualitative methods are helpful in illuminating such tantalizing findings. We 
analyzed participants’ accounts of the decision-making process in HD and found 
strong affective and interpersonal components of the process (3). That paper reports 
the process of decision-making. Preliminary analysis of the content of the decision-
making was also conducted but not completed. We have now had the opportunity to 
complete this analysis, in part prompted by our recent work on family-
communication of genetic test results in hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
(HBOC) (4). We interviewed patients who had taken the genetic test for HBOC and 
biological relatives with whom patients had discussed results. Participants showed a 
moral obligation to take the test, not primarily for oneself but for the benefit of 
other family members. As our preliminary analysis of the HD data suggested 
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something similar was happening, we decided to look again at that data-set with this 
more specific focus. 
The moral issues experienced by at-risk individuals have not been extensively 
studied (5). Taylor’s research points to some of the moral dimensions of predictive 
genetic testing for HD. She offers an insightful analysis of one participant’s 
ambivalence over telling a potential partner about his risk status (5). Another study 
provides three detailed qualitative case-studies of moral issues involved in prenatal 
genetic testing in HD (6).  
 
Methods 
The study employed interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (7). IPA is 
concerned with a participant’s personal experience but recognises that the 
researcher’s interpretations are required to make sense of that other personal world. 
IPA offers detailed idiographic analysis and therefore requires relatively small 
samples. 
The study received NHS ethical approval. All participants were at 50% risk of HD 
and recruited through a medical genetics centre. There were 9 participants- 6 women 
and 3 men. All had children. All names have been changed to protect 
confidentiality.  
Semi-structured interviews on perception of genetic testing were conducted with 
participants in their home. Important issues arising were probed further. Interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Transcripts were coded for the 
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presence of important themes and connections made between themes within and 
cross-case.  
We present here the analysis of one important theme emerging during analysis. In 
the results section, we begin with a summary of how prevalent the theme is for 
subgroups within our set of participants. The primary aim of this paper is to provide 
a thorough and nuanced analysis of how individuals are thinking through the 
decision-making process. As part of this, we need to explore how participant 
circumstances, perceptions and psychological profile contribute to this. Therefore 
the bulk of the results section is given to a detailed account of three participants for 
whom this theme is significant. 
 
Results 
This paper reports one specific theme: ‘Doing the right thing for one’s children’s 
reproductive decision-making’. In our clinical experience, this is commonly given 
as a reason by individuals wanting to take the genetic test for HD. We focus on this 
factor because participants in this study actually employed it as a reason which was 
leading either towards or away from testing.  
Most participants want to do the right thing to assist their children’s reproductive 
decision-making. Four participants wish to take the test and 3 of these claim a major 
reason is to assist with their children’s reproductive decision-making. Two 
participants are currently opposed to taking the test and concern about their 
children’s reproductive decision-making is a key factor in their decision. Three 
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participants are undecided. Two of them explicitly describe a major consideration is 
their children’s reproductive decision-making.  
We now present an analysis of three participants for whom this theme is significant. 
Eleanor 
Eleanor is 30 years old and has two daughters aged 12 and 9.  She wants to take the 
test, ‘for me kids...I need to give them all the information they can possibly have.’ 
HD has affected a high proportion of women in her family and Eleanor is fatalistic 
about the risk for her and her children:  
I’ll be devastated [if tested negative] cos I think I’ve psyched up that 
much for it to be positive… It’s gunna cop for one of mine or both of 
mine. 
Eleanor has witnessed the debilitating effects of HD at close quarters, seeing her 
grandmother become ill when Eleanor was 20 and this strongly colours her 
perception:  
If I do get that bad…I'd take me own life cos I can't see the point of 
being like me Nana is. 
Belief in a high rate of transmission and its debilitating impact seem to inform 
Eleanor’s moral imperative to do what she can to halt the progression of HD, ‘I can 
stop it dead.’ Consistent with this, If she had known she was at-risk before getting 
pregnant, she, ‘wouldn’t have had the test and I wouldn’t have had kids’.  
Eleanor considers a hypothetical future where she doesn’t test, becomes ill with HD 
at 60 and meanwhile her daughter has had four children. She would feel personal 
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responsibility because, ‘I have just carried four more on’. And she can imagine her 
daughter saying: 
“Why didn’t you have that test? You could have stopped me getting 
pregnant…you could have stopped it in our line”. 
Reinforcing her decision to test is Eleanor’s conviction of late onset, believing it 
would start at or around 60. So Eleanor believes that even if she did test positive 
she would have a good life before onset, ‘I‘ve got another 30 years if I’m positive, I 
could do all sorts’.  
Eleanor sees testing as part of a continuing process to keep her children informed: 
I could stop it. I can say to my kids when they are old enough, “look this 
is what is running through the family, you’ve seen your Nana….There are 
tests.” But it’s their decision. 
She subsequently repeats that her daughters would have to make their own 
decisions, ‘It’s their decision, but they will have everything there.’ 
However the ‘everything there’ being offered to the children is pretty loaded by 
Eleanor’s perceptions of HD and what is the right thing to do: 
Hopefully with my two if they’re old enough to understand, then it does 
stop with my line, it stops with my two girls. 
The children will be making a decision within a context which includes Eleanor’s 
powerful belief that the right thing is to do whatever is necessary to stop the 
continuation of HD in the family. 
Angela 
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Angela is in her fifties and has a daughter of 28 with children and a son of 30 who 
does not yet have children. Angela is as adamant as Eleanor that the primary reason 
for testing is to help her children. Her experience of HD is very different to 
Eleanor’s. Angela’s father died recently and was only diagnosed with HD 
posthumously. Angela’s demeanor and cognitive style are also very different to 
Eleanor: 
It’s always the positive things that I think about…I may be the lucky 
one. 
So Angela approaches the testing decision in a very different frame to Eleanor. 
Eleanor has years of experience of the devastating impact of HD and believes she 
has the mutation. Angela has only recently been exposed to HD and is optimistic 
about the risk and its implications. However, just like Eleanor, Angela feels obliged 
to take the test to give her children the relevant information.  
Angela explicitly introduces something not mentioned by Eleanor. Eleanor is so 
concerned with taking the opportunity of stopping a dreadful disease that she does 
not refer to the concomitant cost- potentially stopping the family line. For Angela, 
however, this is a real concern which she could see as a reason pushing her away 
from testing: 
One of the biggest cons was… if my son decided not to have any 
children… and if my daughter’s children decided, if we were ones that 
did have the defect, our family could actually stop now. 
However that for Angela is counteracted by a more important concern: 
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If you’re given the knowledge that you have got a choice whereas…we 
didn’t have any knowledge, we didn’t have any choice….If I didn’t 
take it, I would be then taking on the whole of that power onto 
me…it’s not allowing other people any choice…I think that’s quite 
selfish. 
Compare the two women’s accounts of agency. For Eleanor, testing is an imperative 
assertion of power, ‘I'm in the position, I can stop it dead’. For Angela however, not 
testing would be an equivalently singular decision but one she would not be 
comfortable with. So while Eleanor needs to test as part of cutting down options, 
Angela needs to test to open options up. While Eleanor was clear that the right 
course of action, if one tests positive, is to do what is necessary to stop the 
continuation of HD, Angela is equally clear that there isn’t an obvious right course 
of action: 
But it's still a dilemma if he finds out that he has got the genetic default. 
Does he have the children or doesn't he? … He could be thinking “well I 
want a child whatever” and that would be his decision... If the only way 
to eradicate it is not to have any children… it is quite a powerful 
decision and a choice to make, to end a line in that way. 
William 
William is 30 and has a daughter aged 5. He found out his father had HD when his 
daughter was 1 and his father died a year ago. William’s attitude to testing has 
changed over time. His first reaction was to want the test but he then realized he 
hadn’t thought through the consequences of a positive test result, ‘I wanted to be 
told that I hadn’t got it’. 
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William has currently decided not to take the test. Perhaps because a decision not to 
take the test is not irrevocable, William isn’t as single-minded as Eleanor and 
Angela and offers a number of reasons for not testing. William is concerned he’d 
become demotivated if he got a positive test result. While William is the same age 
as Eleanor, he has a very different conception of expected age of onset, believing it 
could start soon: 
They say 30s…I’m now at the bottom edge it could start now... It’s a 
strange feeling. 
Thus William does not have the psychological luxury of being able to test while 
believing a positive test would not have physical consequences for 30 years.  
William then discusses his wish to protect his daughter. He feels it would be in her 
interests to remain at 25% risk for as long as possible. William links this to her 
projected agency and reproductive decision-making. Like Eleanor, he envisages a 
future conversation with his child. In this case, she might specifically ask him not to 
take the test: 
When she'd say, “…We would like to start a family one day obviously. 
We've got this worry over us…I don't want you to have a test Dad 
because that might, if it's positive, it could really put the kibosh on 
things”. 
William believes having children deepens life experience. Without his daughter, ‘I 
think we'd have a very shallow existence.’ Nevertheless, had he known he was at-
risk earlier, he: 
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Wouldn’t have wanted to get involved in a deep relationship…I don't 
think I would have had the test and I don't think I would have, well I 
wouldn't have children.  
And since discovering he is at-risk, he has had a vasectomy: 
We felt as a couple that it was the responsible thing to do not to put 
another child through it because it’s the only way to totally eradicate 
Huntington’s is not to have children. 
William wishes to preserve a degree of freedom of choice for his daughter. Drawing 
on his own experience, he feels that freedom would be compromised by a 50% 
rather than 25% risk, so he is choosing to avoid an action which could lead to that 
enhanced risk for his daughter. 
Comparing the three cases  
Starting from the same wish to do the right thing by their children, participants are 
faced with a powerful and potentially conflicting set of moral imperatives. 
Individual characteristics mean they see these imperatives differently and end up 
with divergent decision trajectories (see Table 1). 
Table 1 here 
Eleanor and William feel impelled to try to stop HD. Angela and William highlight 
the right of their children to choose to have their own family. It is these two 
positions which can cause a moral tension. 
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Eleanor’s gloomy fatalism and strong desire to stop HD cast a shadow over her 
children’s reproductive decision-making and lead her, unequivocally, to decide to 
test. For her the moral dilemma is not manifest. 
 Angela has less distressing experience of HD and is less pessimistic than Eleanor 
about its impact on her family. She recognizes the potential moral dilemma that her 
testing generates for her descendants, realizing that stopping HD could be at the 
expense of stopping the family line.  However Angela’s optimism, commitment to 
the importance of informed choice, and belief that someone testing positive can still 
have a child means she is also driven to taking the test.  
William most explicitly addresses the dilemma himself as he feels an equal 
commitment to the two imperatives which potentially collide- stopping HD and 
having children. Like Eleanor, he stresses the importance of trying to stop HD. 
However William, like Angela and unlike Eleanor, talks of the great value of having 
children and of the importance of having that choice to decide to have a family. 
William sees the value in not compromising that freedom by gaining potentially 
damaging information. Deciding against testing, for the moment, helps to reconcile 
the opposed moral forces and, in one sense, frees his daughter from the shackle of 
information which Eleanor sees as beneficial.  
Discussion 
Our paper complements previous qualitative work on moral aspects of genetic 
testing (5,6). One study describes some of the moral issues for individuals 
considering genetic testing for HD (e.g. the range of interpersonal commitments 
which can be felt) alongside some powerful idiographic analysis (5). A second paper 
presents three case-studies of individuals’ own reproductive decision-making (6). 
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Our paper shows how individual parents differ in their reading of components in a 
moral obligation to do the right thing for their children, and how this can lead to 
different decisions. 
We can also compare our results with qualitative research on moral aspects of 
genetic testing for HBOC (4,8,9). Women at-risk for HBOC emphasize they are 
testing more for the benefit of other biological relatives than themselves, and 
sometimes women feel pushed into acting in this way. One paper shows a small 
number of at-risk individuals deciding not to test, in-part because of the stress a test 
result would put on others (9).  
Positive test results for HD and HBOC have different implications. With HD, the 
recipient knows they will get the disease and there is no cure. In HBOC, it offers an 
enhanced risk of getting the disease and risk-reducing options are available. The 
value of testing can be seen to be higher in HBOC and hence the predominance of a 
discourse of a need to test in the relevant participants. The issue represents a starker 
moral dilemma in the case of HD because testing offers no medical advantage. 
Therefore participants’ thinking is more directed to existential issues around 
stopping a disease versus stopping a family line.  
It is suggested that most philosophers have been sceptical of the existence of moral 
dilemmas, arguing that apparent moral dilemmas involve conceptual confusion (10). 
One philosopher who did believe there are real moral dilemmas is Sartre (11) who 
describes the predicament of a student in France during the Second World War, 
whose brother has been killed by the German occupiers. The student has to choose 
whether to stay in France and look after his grieving mother or go to England to join 
the resistance. Stressing the inherent moral dilemma, Sartre tells him: 
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 ‘You are free, therefore choose...No rule of general morality can show 
you what you ought to do.’(p38) 
Reflecting on the case, Sartre states: 
We cannot say that this man, in choosing to remain with his mother... 
would be making an irresponsible choice, nor could we do so if he 
preferred the sacrifice of going away to England.(p50) 
We believe the same argument applies to our participants. They each face a difficult 
choice and ultimately need to make their choice themselves. We are not in a position 
to judge a choice as either right or wrong.  
There is also a familial nexus for HD. While participants consider they are doing the 
right thing for their children, those children may in turn eventually face their own 
moral dilemma over testing. And some participants may discover that, well-meaning 
though it was, their children disagree with the decision the parent made. 
Genetic counselling aims to promote understanding of medical facts and inheritance, 
achieve informed consent, facilitate decision-making, manage psychological 
distress, restore feelings of personal control, and help individuals to adapt to a 
genetic condition (12). The focus of genetic counselling is on the process of 
decision-making rather than on the decision that is reached (13). The practice of 
genetic counselling is complex and there is much variation in content and approach 
(14) but a non-directive approach is key (15) and there are clear protocols for the 
genetic counselling of patients considering genetic testing for HD (16). A range of 
counselling skills, such as active listening, reflective questioning and presentation of 
alternative scenarios, may be employed within genetic counselling to help patients 
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reflect on the consequences of their decisions in the context of their family and to 
consider the possible outcomes and implications of their decisions (17). 
We hope our results may be useful to those offering genetic counselling in showing 
how different individuals can conceptualize the apparently same factor in different 
ways. Our results also speak to possible tactics for working with patients 
considering genetic testing for HD. This is analogous to the implications offered for 
clinical practice in (6). Candidates for testing often cite wishing to do what is right 
for their children. Our results offer possible material for engaging in dialogue with 
patients. Examples of how such tactics could be fleshed out are presented in Table2. 
Table 2 here 
The interviews were conducted at a time when exclusion testing in pregnancy was 
available but before pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for HD was as 
available. PGD is an option which is now discussed in genetic counselling and for a 
few couples this can be their first reproductive option. We recognise this limitation 
of our study. However we believe our results still have resonance and relevance.  
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